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In proposing the General Treaty between Germany and the Soviet Union in April 1990, 
Chancellor Kohl and (then) Foreign Minister Genscher viewed it clearly as a package 
deal that would facilitate Soviet concurrence in unification while expediting the 
withdrawal of Soviet forces from East Germany. Although the former German foreign 
minister had become infamous for his at times indiscriminate and imprudent use of 
"checkbook diplomacy," in this case it was the only course open to German policy 
makers.
The assistance package was required to help the Soviet leadership to sell the 
withdrawal from empire plan at home, while defraying some of the costs associated with 
it. Retrospectively, one can see that Bonn's willingness to use its checkbook in support 
of its foreign policy brought the political stability needed for wrapping up the agreements 
providing for German unity and governing the withdrawal of Soviet forces. Of the total 
amount of DM 70 billion to be paid directly or indirectly to the Soviet Union or its 
successor states, only about DM 13 billion is directly related to the withdrawal of former 
Soviet forces. However, the amounts that already have been spent and those that will 
be expended in the future must be viewed as a premium paid to ensure continued 
Soviet compliance with its treaty obligations. In this sense, the continued presence of 
former Soviet forces on German soil gives Moscow leverage in its dealings with 
Germany, although Moscow has as yet refrained from invoking this wild card too openly.
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Already in July 1990 over 173,000 servicemen and dependents were waiting in 
emergency shelters or hotels for permanent housing. The Soviet military would have to 
build at least 440,000 apartments by 1995 to accommodate all the military personnel 
returning from Eastern Europe. Thus the 36,000 apartments, totalling more than 2 
million square meters, that are being built with German assistance amount to under 10 
percent of the overall requirement. In addition, the planned manpower reductions pose 
huge problems to Moscow: There are no jobs for most officers now being retired in an 
economy that is teetering on the brink of collapse. The German program of DM 200 
million to retrain some of them for civilian jobs while still on duty in East Germany can 
alleviate the problem but is by far insufficient to resolve it.
In the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the SED regime, Moscow's elite forces 
experienced a serious identity crisis. Their ability to compare daily "socialist" and 
"capitalist" reality eroded the credibility of the propaganda slogans still issued by the 
officers. Few still cared about their mission and the daily routine at the military bases 
virtually came to a halt. Even Soviet Defense Minister Dimitri Yazov complained about 
the growing lack of discipline, drunkenness, and the inability of the officer corps to keep 
their troops under control.
Given the poor state of morale, abysmal living standards and the harsh regime inside 
the barracks, Soviet soldiers have been defecting in large numbers, beginning 
immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Officially, some 192 Soviet citizens have 
requested political asylum in West Germany, causing a delicate political situation. 
Pursuant to the Basic Law, every refugee has the right to ask for political asylum and 
such requests are being given due process by German authorities. Initially, the Soviets 
tried to handle the problem of defections by sending out search squads to return 
defectors forcibly to their units. This practice was stopped, however, after protests from 
German political authorities. If morale continues to deteriorate, both sides fear that 
some day entire units might defect; indeed, after asking how many defectors to expect, 
a German diplomat was told in the Soviet Foreign Ministry: "Count on about 380,000"—
i.e., the entire force stationed in Germany.
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Since July 1, 1990 the troops receive their salaries in German marks. While a draftee is 
paid a mere DM 25 a month, a senior lieutenant receives DM 800, and a major as much 
as DM 1,500. This has fueled hostility among East Germans, most of whom are worse 
off after unification than the remaining "occupation forces"—especially since the 
German government is footing the bill for the cost of the CIS troops. Roughly DM 10 
billion have been allotted for this purpose, including the costs of returning these forces, 
e.g., transit fees charged by Poland and Czechoslovakia.
Since monetary union, CIS officers can turn their tour in East Germany into a bonanza. 
One month's salary paid in DM amounts to over five years' average salary at home 
when exchanged on the black market. Furthermore, officers can stretch their salaries by 
investing their money in Western consumer goods that fetch a multiple of their original 
price when sold on the black market. Even saving up hard currency can provide officers 
with substantial start-up capital for a business in the former Soviet Union.
Corruption among servicemen is rampant. As early as December 1990 the Supreme 
Commander in East Germany, General Boris Snetkov, and his three deputies fell victim 
to the demoralization of their forces. They were relieved of their duties after a battalion 
commander fled to West Germany, taking his missiles with him. Great profits can be 
made by trafficking in arms. A Kalashnikov with ammunition easily fetches DM 1,000, 
with lesser prices for hand grenades or other weaponry. The CIS armed forces have 
become the armory of organized crime in Germany, perhaps indeed Western Europe as 
a whole. There have been reports that the Russian mafia controls this flourishing 
market. It took only a few months of "capitalist experience" to transform Moscow's 
imperial guard into an undisciplined and demoralized bunch of soldiers, intent on taking 
personal advantage of the circumstances in which they suddenly found themselves.
Perhaps the most serious problem confronting Germany at present is to account for and 
subsequently clean up the ecological mess left behind by the Soviet forces. During their 
stay in East Germany, the Soviets laid claim to about 25 percent of the country. 
According to a preliminary study of the East Ministry of the Environment published in 
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mid-1990, some 440,000 hectares are seriously contaminated, requiring expensive 
clean-up measures.
It is remarkable that Soviet forces have been withdrawn more or less on schedule 
despite the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the steep downturn in economic 
conditions. There are doubtless good reasons for President Yel'tsin's government to 
take every possible effort to demonstrate treaty compliance vis-a-vis Germany. The 
expectation of economic and financial assistance stands out as perhaps the most 
important reason for its straightforwardness on this issue. Germany has been and is 
likely to remain the largest single source of aid. Furthermore, her political support is 
needed to enlist the economic cooperation of the European Community and the Group 
of Seven, particularly the United States.
The litmus test for the former Soviet troops in East Germany will arrive as their 
stationing term comes to a close in about two years. Much will depend on the economic 
conditions then prevailing in the Community of Independent States. It is still premature 
to estimate the number of soldiers who might opt to stay under whatever pretext. Some 
may simply vanish, others may seek marriage to German citizens, others again may 
request asylum. Regardless of what will eventually happen, the Soviet Army in Germany 
proved to be a hollow shield that virtually evaporated within weeks as a fighting machine 
once exposed to "capitalist reality."
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